Some authors describe science not only as a method for establishing criteria of truth, nor merely as an epistemological path of skepticism, but also as a process of self-actualization—one that is at once rigorous and deeply personal.

It is often said that Hegel is not empirical. This is misleading: while his philosophy does not rely on empirical observation in the narrow scientific sense, it remains deeply engaged with reality and experience.

Is reality to be understood as an active, self-differentiating subjectivity? Perhaps for us it can be approached in this way, though the question remains open.

We should recall Victor Cousin’s remark that Hegel fails to develop a fully coherent system—an observation that itself raises questions about what it means to systematize thought.

Is there an Archimedean point—a standpoint outside the world from which truth can be judged—or must all knowledge remain immanent within the play of subject and object?